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ABSTRACT
Multimedia transmission over the Internet has its quality of
service (QoS) requirement. However, Denial-of-Service
(DoS) attacks launch large volumes of traffic and consume
network bandwidth, thus degrading the quality of the
delivered multimedia service. In this paper, we present a
differentiated service protection framework consisting of
anomaly traffic detection and resource management. Data
mining based anomaly traffic detection is implemented at
the host; whereas resource management is responsible for
the allocation of network resources to the applications.
Based on the deviation ofthe monitored traffic to the normal
traffic, differentiated resources are allocated to the traffic.
When suspicious traffic is detected, multimedia
transmission reacts proactively via adjusting the
transmission rate, which can avoid possible packet loss
resulting from DoS bandwidth consumption, and thus
provide better QoS. The impact of the traffic anomalies on
the legitimate services can be mitigated, and the legitimate
services can be protected. Simulation results show that
better PSNR can be achieved for multimedia transmission
during an attack in our proposed framework.
1. INTRODUCTION
Multimedia transmission over the best effort Internet is
susceptible to network Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks or
high bandwidth distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS)
attacks, which the malicious users attempt to launch the
attacks to exhaust the network resources. DoS attacks can
completely occupy the resources of a server, which prevents
legitimate users from accessing the services. DoS attacks
can also deplete the link bandwidth by injecting the traffic
into the router with a high rate. It causes the packets of
legitimate traffic being dropped at the router queue due to
congestion control. The resulting packet loss will degrade
the quality of transmitted video streams. A reliable server
should be able to block the attacking traffic or limit the
resource consumed by the possible illegitimate traffic, while
guaranteeing the resources for the legitimate traffic.
Therefore, how to maintain quality of service (QoS) and
protect multimedia traffic from the illegitimate users during
the DoS attacks is an important issue in Internet
transmission. For this purpose, several approaches have
been proposed in the literature. As an example, the DDoS
attacks were viewed as a resource management problem and
implemented via congestion control at the router [2] [7],
which involves network support. Quality-of-Protection
routing is proposed in [8] to protect against network attacks
and reduce the impact of the attacking traffic. Moreover,
intrusion detection [3] is employed to secure the service
under network attacks. An intrusion detection system (IDS)
can detect the possible attacks or abnormal network
activities and signal an alert. Data mining techniques
provide a promising solution to detect the abnormal traffic.
Anomaly detection approaches build models from the
normal data, and any deviation from the normal model in
the new data is detected as anomaly. Anomaly detection has
the advantage of detecting new types of attacks, while
suffering from a high false alarm rate.
In our earlier study [5], we proposed a secure and
adaptive multimedia transmission framework to provide a
better QoS protection based on attack detection. In this
paper, the focus is on the integration of anomaly traffic
detection and adaptive transmission management to provide
differentiated services for traffic according to its deviation
from the normal traffic. The purpose is to provide a better
service for multimedia transmission and mitigate the impact
of the attacking traffic. In this manner, the security of both
host and network resources can be achieved.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the
overview of the proposed framework. In Section 3, we
present the simulation results and analysis. Conclusions are
given in Section 4.
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2. DIFFERENTIATED SERVICE PROTECTION
FRAMEWORK
2.1 Anomaly Traffic Detection
The tasks that the anomaly traffic detection component
handles include 1) traffic data collection, 2) data
preprocessing, 3) incoming traffic monitoring, and 4)
anomaly detection. In anomaly detection, a set of normal
data is used to train the model. Anomaly can be defined as
those patterns not observed in the normal data set. To detect
anomaly from a new set of test data, the detection algorithm
needs to decide whether the test data is normal or abnormal.
The anomaly traffic detection is designed to target for the
detection of selected types of network intrusion, mainly DoS
and network Probe attacks. LOF [1] is employed as the
anomaly detection approach since LOF has high detection
rates when the false alarm rate is larger than 2% [3].
Features such as the start time and duration, source and
destination IP addresses and ports, and protocol type are
selected and extracted from the network data. The header
information of the packets and some information of the
payload are also extracted to construct the statistics of the
connection. Since DoS and probing usually make a large
number of connections to the host within a period of time
from several seconds to several hours, time interval features
are also collected to detect these two attacks. After the
features are extracted from the processing of the incoming
traffic, they are used for anomaly detection. The selection of
the features should also be able to reduce the computation
cost and achieve a high detection rate. KDD CUP 1999 data
[6] were used as the training data set. There are 22 attack
types in the training data. Among the original 40 features,
30 of them are selected for anomaly detection, which
includes 23 numerical features and 7 nominal features.
Different attack types have different important features. For
DoS attacks, the important features include count,
srv_count, dst host_srv_serror rate, serror rate and
dst host_same_src_port rate, source bytes and destination
bytes [6].
For the incoming traffic to the server, every connection is
monitored and kept as a record. When a connection ends, its
statistics information is generated for the connection. Based
on the statistics information, the selected features are
extracted. LOF is performed on the features for each
connection record and calculates a distance metric. This
distance indicates the deviation of the current record from
the normal traffic activity. The larger the distance metric is,
the farther the traffic is deviated from the normal traffic.
According to the metric calculated for each connection, the
traffic is categorized into three traffic classes: normal traffic,
suspicious traffic, and attack traffic. Two threshold values,
Os and Oa, are defined in which Os < Oa. Oa can be obtained
from the training data set.
* If the distance is smaller than Os, the flow belongs to
normal traffic.
* If the distance is larger than Os and smaller than Oa, the
flow is categorized as suspicous traffic. The flow may
be from a suspicious node intended for a possible
attack.
* If the distance calculated is larger than Oa, the flow is
categorized as attack traffic.
2.2 Differentiated Service for Multimedia
An adaptive video streaming mechanism was previously
proposed in [4]. The transmission rate for multimedia
transmission is based on the network delay, buffer
occupancy, and playback rate of the video streams. A packet
scheduling scheme decides which packets to send to achieve
a better presentation quality at the client. A suitable
sequence of the transmission rates Rk can be obtained by
minimizing the quadratic performance function shown in
Equation (1). The purpose of minimizing Jk is to maximize
buffer occupancy and minimize bandwidth allocation.
Jk = (WpQk+d -WqQr)2 + (w2Rk)2 (1)
where w, wq and wr are the weighting coefficients, Q, is the
allocated buffer size for each client, Qk denotes the number
of packets in the client buffer at the beginning of time
interval k, and d0.1 indicates the network delay. That is, a
change of Rk will result in a change of Qk,do some time
interval later. Furthermore, congestion control was
implemented via adjusting w, within [w _min, wr max]
range. A larger w, will reduce Rk to a smaller value. Under
the constraint of Rk, in order to further improve the video
quality, a multi-buffer packet scheduling scheme at the
source gives a higher priority to those packets of a higher
importance. In a compressed video, a GOP (group-of-
picture) is composed of I, B, and P frames, which packets
from different frames have different effects on the
reconstructed video sequences. Hence, packets of a higher
importance level should be sent in a higher priority to
maximize the presentation quality of the decoded video.
This is achieved by developing multiple buffers with
different importance levels to hold packets with
corresponding importance levels.
The focus of this paper is to provide differentiated
services according to the deviation of traffic from the
normal traffic. For multimedia transmission, when
suspicious traffic or attacking traffic is detected, multimedia
transmission takes proactive actions to adjust its
transmission rate to avoid possible packet loss resulting
from DoS bandwidth consumption. Anomaly traffic
detection is performed on each connection. Based on the
traffic class, the resource management component provides
differentiated services. If the calculated distance metric of
the connection is larger than Os, the connection is diagnosed
as suspicious traffic. Instead of blocking the traffic
immediately, an alert is signaled and sent to the adaptive
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transmission management component. In response to this,
the values of wr max and w, min for w, in Equation (1) are
changed to larger values so that the multimedia transmission
rates will be adjusted to a lower range. If the calculated
distance metric of the connection is larger than Oa, the
connection is diagnosed as attacking traffic. The attacking
traffic will be blocked immediately. Here, we assume the
source addresses of the attacking traffic are known, and
hence IP spoofing is not considered. The source node of this
connection is registered as an attacking node. The current
traffic from the attacking node will be discarded. Any future
connection request from this attacking node will be rejected.
When the attacking traffic from all of the registered
attacking nodes is cut off, the anomaly detection component
sends a signal to the adaptive transmission management
component. The wr max and w, min values will be reset to
the original values, which results in the multimedia
transmission rates being adjusted in a larger range.
3. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
The simulations are run in a prototype system integrating
anomaly traffic detection and resource management at the
server. This prototype system was implemented using NS2.
'oute
<Attac
Figure 1. Network topology used in the simulation.
3.1 Simulation Setup
A scenario to simulate an Internet host is used, where an
application server can provide video streaming and FTP
services. The network topology of the network is presented
in Figure 1, where the link between Router 4 and Router 5 is
the bottleneck link. All the traffic need to go through this
bottle link. The multimedia client requests video streaming
services from the multimedia server. Three FTP clients are
randomly selected to connect to the application for file
transmission. Each time, one of the 4 attack clients is
randomly selected as the attacker to launch the DoS attack.
The purpose of the DoS attack generated by the attackers is
to consume the bottleneck bandwidth. Both of the legitimate
FTP traffic and attack traffic conform to TCP congestion
control and share the bandwidth equally. The legitimate ftp
clients will compete for the bandwidth with the attack ftp
traffic. Standard video test sequences, Mobile & Calendar,
are used for video streaming.
The attack traffic is generated with a large number of
connections to the server in a short time. This is a bandwidth
consumption attack where a few attacker machines will
consume the bandwidth. Since the attack traffic and
legitimate traffic conform to TCP congestion control, both
normal connection and attack connection get the equal share
of the bandwidth. The consequence is that legitimate traffic
is unable to compete with the attack flood traffic, and the
service it receives will be degraded.
3.2 Performance evaluation
In the simulation, we examine how the interaction between
the anomaly traffic detection and adaptive transmission
management components can effectively protect QoS for the
legitimate user in the delivery of multimedia services when
anomaly traffic is detected. First, two cases are studied to
see the advantages of our resource management approach.
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Figure 2. PSNR values of the received video using
adaptive video streaming with/without resource
management.
The Peak Signal-to-noise Ratio (PSNR) metric is used to
evaluate QoS. In Figure 2(a), attacking traffic is blocked
after the detection, while in Figure 2(b), video transmission
service is regulated by differentiated resource management.
A DoS attack will result in bandwidth consumption and
network congestion. Video transmission reduces its sending
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rate in response to the detection of a possible abnormal
traffic to avoid the possible degradation of QoS. As can be
seen from the decreased PSNR values in both Figures 2(a)
and 2(b), the qualities of the video are degraded due to the
drastically reduced available bandwidth for multimedia
transmission caused by the attacking traffic during an attack.
However, in Figure 2(b) which shows the video quality
under resource management, PSNR can always be
maintained at a higher level. When a possible DoS attack is
detected in its initial stage, the server reduces the
transmission rate for the multimedia client so that the
average PSNR values can be maintained at a higher level
than in Figure 2(a). In both cases, the DoS attacks are
detected after a period of time. The connections of the
attack clients are therefore refused, and the bandwidth
resource can be saved for multimedia streaming, so that the
PSNR values in both figures are maintained at a high level
in the later frames. The provision of the streaming service
can then be guaranteed. We also calculated the average
PSNR value of the displayed frames is 31.40 without
resource management, and is 34.07 with resource
management. A performance improvement of 2.67 dB can
be achieved with our proposed framework..
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Figure 3. PSNR values of received video using PLUS
streaming approach.
Comparison is also made with an existing streaming
approach PLUS [9] under the same network scenario with
anomaly traffic detection at the server. As can be seen from
the Figure 3. The PSNR values of PLUS have continuous
degradation of quality because of the attacking traffic. The
average PSNR of the video frames ofPLUS is 27.30 dB. An
improvement of 6.77 dB of the video quality demonstrates
the advantage of the proposed framework. Our framework
can efficiently mitigate the impact of the attacking traffic
and protect the video quality.
resource allocation when anomaly traffic is detected.
Actions are taken for traffic flows according to its deviation
from the normal traffic. Resource management takes
proactive actions to reduce the degradation of the video
quality. The prototype of the proposed system is
implemented. It includes attacking traffic generation, feature
extraction, anomaly detection, and differentiated service
provision. Via the early detection of incipient DoS and the
interaction with the resource management, QoS of
multimedia transmission can be better protected. Simulation
results demonstrate the efficiency of our proposed
differentiated service protection framework for multimedia
transmission.
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4. CONCLUSIONS
Denial-of-Service (DoS) can degrade QoS of multimedia
transmission via launching a large volume of traffic into the
network. Attack detection and active response to the attacks
can mitigate the impact of DoS to provide better QoS. In
this paper, we investigate how to provide differentiated
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